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The formality status of a job is the most widely used indicator of job quality in 
developing countries. However, a number of studies argue that, at least for some 
workers, the informality status may be driven by choice rather than exclusion. 
This paper uses job satisfaction data from three low-income countries (Honduras, 
Guatemala and El Salvador) to assess whether informal jobs are less valued than 
formal jobs. The paper finds substantial differences in job satisfaction within 
different types of informal jobs. More importantly, the results suggest that across 
different definitions, informality does not yield the same ranking of job quality as 
self-reported measures of job satisfaction. This correspondence varies across 
countries, and it seems to be lower for less-skilled workers. 
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A widely held hypothesis in the development literature is that informal jobs are marginal, low- 
productivity activities in a dual labor market. According to this view, informal workers are 
barred by institutional or market barriers from accessing formal jobs with superior pay and 
higher benefits. Support for this view has been provided by studies that show wages and benefits 
to be lower in the informal sector (Heckman and Hotz, 1986; Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995; 
Gong and Van Soest, 2001: Pratap and Quintin, 2006).  
In contrast, some studies state that, at least for some workers, the informality status may 
be driven by choice rather than exclusion (Perry et al., 2007). It has been argued that workers 
may prefer the autonomy and independence afforded by self-employment (Maloney, 2004). 
Workers may also find a greater degree of flexibility, particularly regarding work schedules and 
hours of work in informal jobs, which may suit people with competing time demands, such as 
parents of young children or students. Workers may also value the possibility of evading taxes 
and social security contributions from which they derive little value (Maloney, 2004). This may 
be particularly relevant if governments provide free-of-charge social services targeted to 
informal workers (Levy, 2008).  
Recent work has attempted to disentangle which view provides a better fit for the data. 
While studies find that on average wages tend to be higher in the formal sector, workers may 
differ in a number of unobserved ways in regards to their ability, effort or preferences, affecting 
their earnings potential. Controlling for such differences using semi-parametric approaches 
(Pratap and Quintin, 2006) or panel data (Pagés and Stampini, 2007) reduces or even reverses 
such wage differentials.
2 Moreover, Yamada (1996) and Earle and Sakov (2000) find positive 
selection into self-employment, suggesting that those workers have a comparative advantage in 
being micro-entrepreneurs.  
Studies have also resorted to studying workers’ mobility patterns; if workers prefer 
formal employment, they should voluntarily move from informal to formal sector jobs while 
involuntary mobility should go in the opposite direction. Studies of mobility find high rates of 
mobility across formal and informal salaried jobs and low mobility between formal salaried jobs 
                                                 
2 Similarly, Magnac (1991) for Colombia, Yamada (1996) for Peru, Maloney (1999) for Mexico, and Earle and 
Sakov (2000) for five transition economies find little evidence that formal salaried workers have higher earnings 
than self-employed workers.    5
and self-employment (Maloney, 1999; IDB, 2004; Bosch and Maloney, 2007; Pagés and 
Stampini, 2007). They also find that mobility is higher from informal salaried to formal salaried 
jobs, consistent with a higher preference for formal salaried jobs.   
Mobility studies, however, do not fully solve the problem because to date, existing data 
do not permit observing whether mobility is voluntary or involuntary. This makes it difficult to 
identify whether mobility patterns reflect workers’ preferences for a specific type of job, barriers 
to entry into some occupations, or employers’ preferences for certain types of workers. 
This paper uses job satisfaction data from three low-income countries (Honduras, 
Guatemala and El Salvador) to assess whether informal job are less valued than formal jobs. 
Following a growing literature on subjective well-being, we assess whether there are barriers to 
entry to formal employment by comparing levels of job satisfaction across formal and informal 
jobs.  If formal workers enjoy rents and enjoy higher utility at work, then they should report 
higher levels of job satisfaction than informal workers. In similar approaches, subjective well-
being measures have been used to understand the determinants of job quality (Clark, 2004; 
Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000) or whether unemployment is involuntary (Oswald, 1997; 
Clark and Oswald, 1994; DiTella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 2003). Comparisons of job 
satisfaction have also been used to assess whether the self-employed enjoy rents relative to 
salaried workers (Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer, 2001; Kawaguchi, 2008).  To date, 
however, studies of this type have been almost entirely conducted in the context of developed 
countries.
3 
The question of whether formal jobs are higher quality than informal ones is relevant for 
at least two reasons: First, the formality status of a job is the most widely used indicator of job 
quality in developing countries. It is also used as a measure of labor slack, as unemployment 
figures may be misleading when, unemployment insurance is not available, and unemployed 
individuals need to find any job quickly to support themselves and their families. It is therefore 
important to assess whether a commonly used measure of informality correlates with workers’ 
own preferences for jobs.  
Second, there is growing interest in understanding the role of informality in the process 
of economic development. In particular, there is interest in assessing whether informal activities 
                                                 
3 To our knowledge, the only studies examining data of job satisfaction in the context of developing countries are 
Pratap and Quintin (2006) for Argentina and Perry et al. (2007) for the Dominican Republic and Colombia.     6
are the last resort of those who cannot enter the formal sector or, instead, by compensating lower 
productivity rates with tax evasion they detract workers from formal, more efficient firms, 
leading to an inefficient allocation of labor and lower total factor productivity (see, for example, 
Hsieh and Klenow, 2007). The second scenario is more likely when workers have similar 
valuation for informal and formal jobs.   
While it is widely recognized that the informal sector is highly heterogeneous, in practice 
most studies bunch many different types of employment into the broad concept of the informal 
sector. Moreover, the definition of informality varies across studies making comparisons very 
difficult. One strand of literature uses a job category-based definition of the informal sector 
following the 1993 International Conference of Labor Statisticians (ICLS). According to this 
view, the informal sector comprises non-professional self-employed activities, unpaid workers, 
employees of microenterprises (defined as firms with fewer than five or 10 workers) and owners 
of microenterprises.
4  Other social scientists define informal workers as those who are not 
enrolled in social security and do not enjoy the protections of labor laws. We refer to this as the 
benefit-based definition. In 2003, the ICLS proposed a new definition which merged the job 
category and the benefits-based view. Under this new definition, informal workers would be 
those under the job category-based definition plus employees holding informal jobs, that is,  all 
those forms of employment relationships which in  law or in practice are not subject to national 
labor legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment 
benefits. We denote this as the merged definition of informality. 
Rather than adhering to any particular definition, in this study we distinguish among four 
categories of employment: self-employed, employed in microenterprises; employed in firms of 
more than five workers (large firms) with social security (benefits) and employed in large firms 
without benefits.
5 We then group those four categories according to the three definitions of 
formality and examine how well formality status correlates with job quality as defined by 
workers’ own assessments of their job satisfaction. 
Our approach yields a number of insights.  First, we find heterogeneous valuation across 
types of jobs. This implies that, when jobs are bunched into informality according to the different 
                                                 
4 The 1993 ILO report of the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians allows flexibility in the 
inclusion or exclusion of professional self-employed, domestic help and unpaid workers as part of the informal 
sector.  
5 We cannot separately track workers employed in unpaid jobs, owners of enterprises, domestic help and workers 
employed in small firms with benefits due to insufficient number of observations.   7
definitions, there is substantial heterogeneity of job valuation within informal jobs. Within jobs 
typically classified as informal jobs, self-employment activities are the most preferred, while 
being employed in a small firm tends to be less preferred. Second, we find that some formal jobs 
compare well with some informal jobs, but these comparisons change across countries. Lastly, 
we find heterogeneity of valuations across skill level. While the results are only tentative due to 
the small number of observations, we find suggestive evidence that less-skilled workers have a 
higher relative valuation for self-employment and a lower relative valuation for jobs with 
benefits.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical approach; Section 3 
describes the data used in this paper; Section 4 presents the main results as well as some 
robustness analysis and extensions for Honduras; Section 5 presents results by level of skill for 
Honduras; Section 6 presents results for El Salvador and Guatemala; and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Approach  
 
We examine the determinants of self-reported job satisfaction (JSi) as a function of: (1) a vector 
Xi of observable worker characteristics;  (2) a vector Z1i of variables defining our main job 
categories (self-employed, employed in a microenterprise, employed in larger enterprise with 
benefits and employed in a larger enterprise without benefits); (3) a vector Z2i of additional 
objective job characteristics such as hours of work, industry, and earnings;  and (4) a vector Z3i of 
subjective, self-reported perceptions about the job, such as assessments on job prospects, 
satisfaction with work schedule, or job-related stress. Lastly, εi  denotes an error term. Therefore: 
 
    JSi =U(Xi, Z1i, Z2i, Z3i, εi) =      Z Z Z   X i 3   3i 2 2i 1 1i i ε α + + + + + B B B Bo    (1) 
 
where  Bo,  B1,  B2 and B3 are vectors of coefficients, and 
   )   )  Z ,  Z ,  Z , U(X ( ) 1 ( i   3i, 2i 1i i ε Φ = = i JS P where Φ(.)  denotes a standard normal distribution. 
A methodological issue that needs to be addressed when dealing with perception-based 
variables is that answers to subjective questions may be influenced by some innate, non-
observable traits, such as individuals’ degree of optimism or pessimism. This implies that the 
error term might be correlated with Z3i, because optimistic individuals might be both more 
satisfied with their jobs and at the same time have a more benign assessment of different job 
attributes relative to a more pessimistic individual. Another potential problem is that such   8
unobservable traits may be correlated with the choice of jobs (for example, more optimistic 
people may be more likely to become self-employed and at the same time more likely to be 
happier at work). A possible solution has been proposed by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2004). It involves using information on individuals’ valuation on other aspects of their life or 
environment (for example, satisfaction with health services, satisfaction with transport or 
education) and regress each of them against a set of observed individual characteristics. A 
principal component analysis is then performed using the errors of those regressions as the input. 
The first principal component of those errors might be thought to represent optimism or 
pessimism (Ki). We add this variable to some specifications of the model to assess the robustness 
of our results based on (1).
6  
We further investigate whether other possible problems in the estimation affect our 
results. The first is to estimate the model correcting for selection bias due to the exclusion of 
non-employed individuals.  Selection-bias may be particularly serious for female workers given 
the still relatively low—by industrial country standards—participation rates of women in Latin 
America.  
Another issue is that, even after controlling for selection into employment one could 
question the results on the grounds that unobservable variables (beyond optimism) drive both the 
selection of job categories and job satisfaction.  In that case, worker categories do not cause job 
satisfaction but rather become a proxy for unobservables correlated with job categories and job 
satisfaction.   
While this problem can only be properly dealt with using panel data, our data contain 
information on whether salaried workers would rather be working as self-employed and vice-
versa, which can be employed to assess the importance of unobservables.  Nearly 80 percent of 
salaried workers in Honduras report that they would prefer to be self-employed, while only 32 
percent of the self-employed workers in our sample would rather work for a wage.   
                                                 
6 The variables used to construct the optimism in Honduras are: “Do you think that academic success depends on 
each person’s abilities and effort?” (yes/no); “How much are you satisfied with the Public Health services quality in 
your Country?” (1-10); “How much are you satisfied with the Public Education System in your Country?” (1-10); 
“How much are you satisfied with the Public Transportation System in your Country?” (1-10); “Generally speaking, 
could you say that you can trust in most people or that you need to be careful in trusting others?” (1-10). Variables 
used to construct the variable are similar in El Salvador and Guatemala.    9
We exploit this information to assess the validity of our cross-sectional estimates in the 
following manner. Let us consider only two types of jobs, salaried and self-employed jobs and 
assume that job satisfaction of individual i in job j is given by equation (2): 
 
    JSij =U(Xi, Z1i, Z2i, Z3i, εij) =      Z Z D   X ij 3   3ij 2 2ij ij 1 i ε β α + + + + + B B Bo i  (2) 
 
where αi is an individual fixed effect, X is a vector of observable individual and D  is a dummy 
variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the individual is employed in a salaried job. Similarly, Z2 
and Z3 respectively denote two vectors of objective and subjective job characteristics.  Finally let 
εij denote an error term that depends on both the individual and the job that she performs.  Let us 
also define  k i S Jˆ as the job satisfaction attained in the alternative job (salaried, if the individual is 
observed as a self-employed worker, and self-employed if the individual is a salaried worker). 
Then, individual i, reports preferring a job over the alternative if   JSij> k i S Jˆ  and therefore:  
 
ik 3 3ik  2 2ik ik 1 ij 3   3ij 2 2ij ij 1 Z ˆ Z ˆ D ˆ      Z Z D   ε β ε β + + + > + + + B B B B  
 
Assuming that individuals compare across wage and self employment opportunities with the 
same job amenities then: 2ik 2ij Z ˆ  Z = , 3ik 3ij Z ˆ  Z =  and    ) D ˆ   - (D   ik ij 1 ν β − > with  ik ij ε ε ν − =   If ν is 
distributed as a standard normal distribution then: 
 
Prob(JSij> k i S Jˆ )=Φ() D ˆ   - (D ik ij 1 β )    (3) 
 
which allows us to estimate the effect of job category (D) on job satisfaction free from any biases 
created by time-invariant, individual-specific, unobservable variables correlated with D, under 
the hypothesis that there are only two job categories and comparisons are made based on 
assuming the same amenities across jobs. The comparison of estimating this model versus model 
(2) allows us to gauge the effect of non-observables on our estimates.  
Finally, another useful check can be obtained by estimating the following model  
 
Yij =      Z Z Z   X ij 3   3ij 2 2ij 1 1ij i ε + + + + B B B Bo      (4) 
 
for the sample of salaried workers, where Yij is equal to 1 if the worker would prefer to be self-
employed and zero if she prefers to be salaried, with B1 and Z1 defined as in model (1).  Since the 
dependent variable compares preferences across occupations by same individual, it is less liable   10
to omitted variable bias than model (1).  Comparing results obtained with (4) relative to those 
obtained with (1) provides another indication of the severity of the omitted variable bias.  
 
3. Data  
 
The analysis in this paper uses recently available information from a special round of quality of 
life (QoL) surveys for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In the three countries the surveys 
were collected by their National Statistical Offices in 2007. The QoL surveys are nationally 
representative and gathered data from one randomly chosen respondent aged 18 or older from 
each household selected to answer the special module. In Honduras, the data contain information 
on 8,282 individuals, in El Salvador 1,082 individuals, and in Guatemala 1,400 individuals. 
Given the larger number of observations, we mainly focus on the Honduras data; however, we 
also present some additional information from El Salvador and Guatemala. 
The sample to estimate the models consists of all QoL respondents between 18 and 64 
years old who were employed at the time of the survey. For each country, these surveys asked 
people about their individual characteristics, living conditions, income, education attainment and 
health status. Furthermore, they provide detailed data on objective and subjective work 
attributes. Among the objective, the surveys contain information on earnings, hours worked, 
sector, and occupations. It also contains information on job satisfaction and subjective 
assessments about work schedule, future prospects, job security, job content, stress and 
remuneration. The QoL surveys additionally contain information on whether salaried workers 
would rather be in self-employment and vice versa, which is useful in assessing workers’ 
preferences. Lastly, it covers individual’s perceptions on the conditions and policies relative to a 
number of areas such as education, health and security.  
In terms of work category, we define four possible groups: self-employed, employed in a 
microenterprise (fewer than 10 employees), employed in a firm with more than 10 employees 
and contributing to social security, and employed in a large firm (ten or more employees) 
without contributing to social security. We could not track the categories domestic help or 
unpaid work due to an insufficient number of observations. Similarly, we could not distinguish 
between self-employed workers and workers in small firms with and without social security 
benefits because in the three countries there were too few workers in self-employment or 
employed in small firms who were contributing to social security.       11
We control for individuals’ health state by means of a constructed health score (EQ-5D) 
widely used in the health literature, following Shaw et al. (2004). The score is constructed using 
five questions that ask the individual to rank whether she had difficulties regarding the following 
dimensions: physical mobility, self-care ability, usual activities performance, pain and 
discomfort, and finally anxiety or depression. The weighted score goes from -1 to 1, and a higher 
number indicates that the individual feels healthier.  
Regarding job characteristics, the three surveys register hours of work, although the 
questions are slightly different.  In Honduras, the survey asks for hours of work during the week 
prior to the interview. In El Salvador, and Guatemala the question relates to average hours per 
week. In all cases, we convert those figures to monthly figures by assuming four weeks per 
month. The information on earnings also differs across surveys. In Honduras, our main country 
of study, the survey provides information about monthly earnings in the principal job, which we 
enter as the logarithm of earnings in our specifications.  In Guatemala and El Salvador, 
respondents are asked to select among five different earnings brackets, which implies that we can 
only control for labor income bracket in our specifications. 
The main variable of analysis, job satisfaction, is measured with the question: “Are you 
satisfied with the work you do?” and the possible answers are “yes” or “no”. There are also other 
questions related to work perceptions with the same possible answers “yes” or “no”. The 
question on job security is formulated as “Do you thing you could lose your job in the next six 
months?” Regarding opportunities at work, the question states “At work, do you have the 
opportunity to progress?” In regard to remuneration, the question is “Do you think you earn what 
you deserve for what you do?” On stress, the question is “Do you think your job is too 
stressful?” On job content, the survey asks “Could you say your job is boring?” On job safety, 
the question is “Do you think your job is dangerous for your health?” Finally, the question 
related to work schedule is phrased as “Do you have a good work schedule?”  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for Honduras, our main country of focus in this paper, 
for the sample of employed people 18-64 years old. The data have been weighted to match the 
distribution of the population by age, gender and education.  About 54 percent of the workers in 
the sample are self-employed, 18 percent are salaried in small firms, 3 percent are employed in 
large firms and contributing to social security and another 25 percent are employed in large firms 
and not contributing.  In addition, 64 percent of the workers in the sample are males, and the   12
average age is 37 years old. Nearly half of the workers are in rural areas, and education 
attainment levels are very low; 40 percent of the workers have not completed primary school and 
46 percent have only graduated from primary school. In terms of the industrial structure, 29 
percent of workers are in the primary sector, and 17 percent are in manufacturing. Job 
satisfaction is quite high: 84 percent of those working declare being satisfied with their jobs, 84 
percent are happy with their work schedule, 57 percent report being well remunerated and 16 
percent think they can lose their job in the next six months. Finally, 33 percent state their work is 
dangerous, and 51 percent feel their work is stressful. 
Guatemala’s labor market is similar to Honduras’ in that a large proportion of workers 
are self-employed, and very few workers receive benefits, even in large firms (Table A1 in the 
Appendix). In contrast, in El Salvador, there is a lower proportion of self-employed workers and 
a higher percentage of salaried workers, both in small firms and in large firms with benefits.  
Education attainment is highest in El Salvador, while in Guatemala is similar to that of 
Honduras. Job satisfaction is also very similar to the level observed in Honduras, with nearly 82 
percent of workers reporting being satisfied with their job in both countries. The percentage of 
workers who feel well remunerated is lower, however, at only 40 percent in Guatemala and 34 
percent in El Salvador. Moreover, a higher percentage of workers indicate that they have a 
monotonous or dangerous job or that they may lose their jobs than in Honduras.  
Table 2 confirms that there are important differences in the prevalence of different job 
attributes across types of jobs in Honduras. Workers employed in small enterprises earn on 
average less than the self-employed, who in turn earn less than workers employed in larger firms. 
In addition, among the latter, workers who receive benefits earn more than workers not affiliated 
with social security.   
In terms of hours, workers in self-employment work the least hours, while workers 
employed in large firms without benefits work the most. Self-employed and workers in micro-
enterprises tend to be concentrated in the commerce, construction and retail sectors, while 
workers employed in larger firms, particularly those with benefits, tend to be in high-paying 
services (financial, insurance and social services)  and utility sectors. 
Workers in small enterprises tend to report the least job amenities. They are more likely 
to report having a dangerous or monotonous job and less likely to report being well remunerated, 
being able to progress at work, or to have a good schedule.  Moreover, they report less job   13
stability, with almost 30 percent stating that they may lose their job in six months. In contrast, 
workers in large firms with benefits tend to report the most amenities (less dangerous, less 
monotonous, more ability to progress, better schedule, and higher job security). They also report 
the highest levels of stress. It is quite interesting that self-employed workers are the most likely 
to report they are well remunerated of all types of workers.  In addition, in some aspects, self- 
employed workers report more job amenities than workers in large firms without benefits. For 
example, they report higher job security, less stress and more satisfaction with their work 
schedule, and they are less likely to report having a dangerous job.  
The former suggests that at least in Honduras, workers in larger firms, with benefits, tend 
to have the best jobs, at least when measured by earnings and a range of job amenities, while 
workers in small enterprises have the worst. The self-employed and those employed at large 
firms without benefits lie somewhere in between. Job satisfaction provides a similar ranking. The 
highest percentage of workers satisfied with their jobs is attained by workers in large firms with 
benefits, while the lowest occurs among workers employed at microenterprises. Quite notably, 
self-employed workers report levels of job satisfaction above those of workers in large firms 
without benefits. The next section re-examines these relationships in the context of the empirical 




Table 3 reports the results of estimating model (1) for Honduras under different specifications 
that consider objective and subjective job attributes. The first column reports results across job 
categories without controlling for other variables. Relative to the omitted variable (self-
employment) salaried workers in small firms are 13 percent less likely to report they are satisfied 
with their jobs, while salaried workers employed in large firms and affiliated with social security 
are significantly more likely to be satisfied. It is worth mentioning that employees of large firms 
not affiliated with social security are as likely to be satisfied with their jobs as self-employed 
workers are. The former suggests that definitions of informality based on social security 
affiliation status are better associated with job satisfaction, and arguably job quality, than firm-
size based definitions. 
Adding individual characteristics does not change the results but the magnitude of the 
relevant coefficients is reduced (column 2). Workers with higher education attainment are more   14
likely to report being satisfied with their jobs. Similarly, married and healthier workers are more 
likely to report positive job satisfaction.  
Including additional job attributes such as hours of work or industry increases the 
coefficient for employees in large firms with benefits (column 3) but this coefficient becomes 
insignificant once monthly earnings are accounted for (column 4). Thus, the positive satisfaction 
differential would be fully explained by the higher earnings offered by these jobs. As expected, 
the coefficient on earnings is positive, and its magnitude suggests that a 10 percent increase in 
earnings increases the probability of job satisfaction by 0.5 percentage points. It is also 
noteworthy that, once individual and objective work characteristics are controlled for, women are 
more likely to be satisfied at work than men, at least, suggesting a differential in expectations 
(Clark, 1997).  
Columns (5) and (6) add subjective work attributes.  The coefficient for salaried workers 
in large firms with benefits increases, and becomes statistically significant in that case,   
suggesting that some subjective job attributes positively associated with job satisfaction are less 
prevalent for employees of large firms with social security benefits. Regarding those job 
characteristics, workers who think they are well-remunerated or have a good work schedule are 
13 and 12 percentage points  more likely of being satisfied at work, respectively, than those who 
do not.  Additionally, having good opportunities to progress in the job increases the probability 
of being satisfied at work by 8 percentage points. In contrast, job insecurity, or having a job 
considered to be monotonous reduces the probability of being satisfied at work by about 8 and 5 
percentage points, respectively. 
The last columns assess whether these results are driven by a possible correlation 
between individuals’ degree of optimism or pessimism and the error term.  We find this not to be 
the case. Controlling for the level of individual optimism, constructed as described in Section 2, 
does not affect our results in any way. In addition, the coefficient of optimism is not significant 
in this regression.  
To summarize, the relationship between job category and job satisfaction is not a simple 
one. Workers employed in large firms who receive benefits appear to be more satisfied at work 
than self-employed workers or workers working in similar firms who do not receive benefits. In 
turn, workers employed in small firms are clearly worse off than all types of workers. Such lower   15
satisfaction may be derived from not having access to social security or due to some other 
differences in the nature of jobs not captured in these data.    
Relating these results to the different definitions of informality we find that the practice 
of bunching different job categories into one aggregate definition of informality does not seem 
very useful given the important degree of heterogeneity in job valuations. Category-based 
definitions of informality would miss the higher valuation of self-employment relative to salaried 
jobs in micro-firms, and it would not properly capture that workers in larger firms without 
benefits seem to be equally well off than the self-employed.  The benefit-based and merged 
definitions of informality would do a better job since, in the case of Honduras, they would 
capture that many workers in large firms do not have benefits and that those without benefits 
have a lower valuation of jobs even in larger firms.  Yet, as we describe below, the 
correspondence of informality according to these definitions with job valuations, as reported by 
workers, is lower in other countries and for low-skilled workers.  
 
4.1 Selection in Employment  
 
The former results do not account for a possible selection in employment, which could be 
particularly severe for women. To assess whether the results are robust to the presence of 
selection, we follow the Heckman (1976) method. In a first step, the participation equation 
includes all the personal characteristics included in the job satisfaction specifications presented 
in Table 3 plus two other variables that are assumed to affect the probability of employment, but 
not to influence self-reported job satisfaction. The results reported in Table 4 (column 1) include 
the number of children less than 10 years old in the household and its interaction with gender of 
parent as instruments for participation. Given the concern that number of children may be 
endogenous to job satisfaction—as people with very young children may be more stressed and 
feel less satisfied with their work—the specification presented in the second column of Table 4 
uses as instruments for participation the number of children younger than 10 years old and older 
than four as well as its interaction with gender of parent. 
In both cases, the correlation between the error terms of the participation and job 
satisfaction equations are positive and statistically significant, indicating that individuals more 
likely to be satisfied with their jobs are also more likely to participate in paid work. However, 
correcting for this form of selection does not alter the main results as the coefficients on job   16
categories remain similar to those presented in Table 3, column 6, although larger in absolute 
value. The former suggests a higher preference for jobs in large firms with benefits and a lower 
preference for being salaried in a small firm relative to self-employment.  As before, the 
coefficient on being salaried in a large firm without benefits is not statistically significant from 
zero.  
 
4.2 Further Selection Issues 
 
We further check whether these results are driven by unobservable variables correlated to job 
category and job satisfaction following the approach described in Section 2. Table 5, column 1, 
reports the results of estimating a Probit model including only a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the worker is in a salaried job.  Column 2 reports the results of performing the 
estimation based on model (3) that is, when the dependent variable is 1 if the individual prefers 
to be salaried (and zero if she prefers to be self-employed). The independent variable takes the 
value of 1 when the worker is salaried ( ) 0 D ˆ   and   1 D ik ij = = and -1 when self-employed 
() 1 D ˆ   and   0 D ik ij = = . Quite reassuringly, both coefficients are very similar, which suggests that 
omitted variable bias does not seem to be a serious problem in the estimates obtained from our 
baseline model.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on salaried in column (1) is negative and statistically 
significant, which indicates, that on average, individuals are more likely to feel satisfied with 
their jobs in self-employment than in salaried jobs. Column (3) reports the results of estimating 
model (4) in the population of salaried workers, where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 
if the individual prefers self-employment to being salaried. Results show that workers in salaried 
jobs in large firms with benefits are less likely to prefer self-employment than workers in large 
firms without benefits, while at the same time the latter are less likely to prefer self-employment 
than workers in small firms. This confirms the ordering of jobs obtained from model (1), 
suggesting again that omitted variable bias is not driving the results. 
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5. Results by Level of Education 
 
It may be argued that job opportunities and therefore attained job satisfaction in different job 
categories is likely to vary across workers depending among other factors on their educational 
attainment.
7  Table 6 presents results analogous to those in Table 3, column (6) separating the 
sample by level of education. Results should be interpreted with caution given the small number 
of observations.  For workers with the lowest educational attainment, the probability of job 
satisfaction is lower when working in a small firm relative to when self-employed.  In addition, 
being employed in a large firm without benefits does not increase the probability of job 
satisfaction. There are not enough workers in the lowest skill group employed in large firms with 
benefits to estimate the effect of benefits on their satisfaction. For primary school graduates there 
are no differences in the probability of job satisfaction across categories. In contrast, high school 
graduates attain a higher probability of job satisfaction when employed as salaried workers in 
larger firms with benefits. There are no statistically significant preferences across employment 
categories for workers with college education.  This is the case even after controlling for 
objective and subjective differences in job quality and in the degree of individual optimism. The 
above patterns suggest lower valuation for social security benefits for workers with either low or 
very high education attainment. They also suggest that, particularly for workers with lower levels 
of education, being self-employed provides as good or better job opportunities than being 
salaried either in large or a small firm.    
Quite remarkably, the former implies that no definition of informality would work 
particularly well for the low skilled workers in Honduras, as they would fail to capture, the 
relative attractiveness of self-employment relative to other options, as well as the seemingly low 
valuation for jobs with benefits for this group.  
 
6. Other Countries 
 
How typical are the results found for Honduras? While smaller in size, the analysis of similar 
surveys in Guatemala and El Salvador allow us to assess whether the results found in Honduras 
generalize to other countries.  It is quite interesting that the ordering in the probability of job 
satisfaction across job categories differs across countries. The results indicate that in Guatemala, 
                                                 
7 This is the underlying reason why in many studies self-employed professionals are excluded from category-based 
definitions of informality.    18
workers in self-employment are more likely to be satisfied in their job than workers in any other 
category, with exception of workers employed in large firms with benefits, who tend to be as 
satisfied as the self-employed.  In El Salvador, workers in large firms who are not affiliated with 
social security report higher job satisfaction than self-employed workers or workers in small 
firms, with no difference between the two latter categories. In turn, workers in large firms who 
receive benefits seem to attain the same level of job satisfaction as the self-employed.  While 
these results are quite unexpected, splitting the sample between workers with low and high levels 
of educational attainment provides further clues. Table 7 presents specifications analogous to 
those presented in Table 3, column 1 for these two countries—that is, when no additional 
controls are included—although the results are qualitatively similar when the full set of controls 
is included. Even though the smaller number of observations does not allow for the same level of 
disaggregation as in Honduras, we also find that being employed in a large firm with benefits is 
associated with a higher probability of job satisfaction only for workers who have completed 
primary education or higher.  Instead, workers with lower educational attainment tend to have a 
higher relative preference for self-employment and denote a lower relative preference for jobs 
that imply paying into social security (see Table 8). It is quite noteworthy that in both countries, 
and particularly for low-skilled workers, the three definitions of informality fail to correlate with 
job satisfaction.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
Formality status is the widest used indicator of job quality in developing economies. Using 
newly available data for three low-income countries—Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador—
this study assesses the extent to which formality, according to the most common definitions, 
reflects workers’ stated preferences.  
Our findings suggest large heterogeneity in valuations within informal jobs and across 
formal and informal jobs. They also indicate job satisfaction correlates quite poorly with the 
rankings of quality that would be derived when using formality as an indicator of good jobs and 
informality as an indicator of bad ones.  This is particularly the case for low-skilled workers, 
who seem to have a higher relative valuation for self-employment and a lower relative valuation 
for jobs which imply paying into social security. Yet, given the very small size of the samples by   19
education groups, these latter results should be taken as tentative and awaiting further 
confirmation in larger samples.  
Our results seem to be robust to a number of econometric problems that emerge in cross- 
sectional data.  Using information on whether workers would prefer other types of jobs to the 
one they currently hold, we can implement a fixed-effect type of estimation that allows 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Our results also seem to be robust to differences in 
optimism, which can bias results based on perception data. Overall, these tests increase our 
confidence that our results are not driven by omitted variable bias, and that we are instead 
capturing the causal relationship between job category and job satisfaction.  
Given these results it is important to further test for and investigate the potential reasons 
behind the seemingly low valuation of social security benefits by low skilled workers. Some 
studies point to the low quality of benefits, particularly for the poor. For example, Levy (2008) 
reports that in Mexico social security health benefits are not cost-effective for the poor given the 
low number of hospitals and health services in poor areas that are paid for by social security. To 
access social security-sponsored health benefits poor workers have to travel long distances or 
receive attention in very poorly staffed centers. Similarly, poor workers may value receiving an 
old age pension less than higher-income workers, given their shorter life expectancy and a higher 
reliance on the help of children or relatives to support them in their old age.  Less financial 
literacy and a lower ability to defer present consumption may also explain their lower valuation 
of social security.  
Another result worth further exploration is what determines the differences in job 
valuation across types of jobs across countries. Why, for instance, is self-employment so highly 
valued in Guatemala, and what makes jobs in small firms less attractive in Guatemala than in El 
Salvador?  Differences in the ability of workers to access credit may explain whether on average, 
self-employed workers are relatively happier than many categories of salaried workers. As 
described in the model developed by Jeong and Townsend (2007) in countries where credit is 
scarce and workers who have good ideas and entrepreneurial skill have a hard time finding 
credit, there will be a larger mismatch between talent and initial wealth holdings. In this 
situation, many workers who could have their own business will not be able to do so for lack of 
access to credit, having to work instead as salaried workers in other firms.    20
Finally, it is important to consider what these results mean for the allocation of labor and 
capital across activities in the economy. The fact that workers are equally happy or happier in 
informal jobs does not imply that the allocation of resources across activities is optimal. As 
emphasized in models such as those developed by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) or Hsieh and 
Klenow (2007), policies that create heterogeneity in the prices of inputs or output faced by 
establishments distort the allocation of resources and lead to lower total aggregate factor 
productivity. Differences in law enforcement across firms may be an important source of such 
heterogeneity. However, uneven law enforcement will lead to distortion of resource allocation 
only when firms that pay and firms that do not pay taxes or social security contributions produce 
the same good or compete in the same input markets.  The evidence presented here suggests that 
formal and informal activities may compete for the same workers and take market share from 
formal firms.  Confirming the validity of this claim in alternative, larger samples and quantifying 
its importance for productivity are topics for future research.  
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics, Honduras 
Weighted Sample of Workers 18 to 64 Years Old
Variable Mean St. Dev Min Median  Max Obs.
Dependent Variable
Job Satisfaction 0.835 0.371 0 1 1 3643
Job Category, Firm Size and Benefit Status (Z 1i)
Salaried_small 0.180 0.384 0 0 1 3643
Salaried_large_benefits 0.026 0.160 0 0 1 3643
Salaried_large_nobenefits 0.250 0.433 0 0 1 3643
Self-employed 0.538 0.499 0 0 1 3643
Individual Characteristics (Xi)
Male 0.640 0.480 0 1 1 3643
Age (Years) 37.051 12.134 18 36 64 3643
Age squared 1519.961 964.481 324 1296 4096 3643
Urban 0.541 0.498 0 1 1 3643
Education 1 0.398 0.490 0 0 1 3622
Education 2 0.457 0.498 0 0 1 3622
Education 3 0.081 0.273 0 0 1 3622
Education 4 0.064 0.244 0 0 1 3622
Married 0.667 0.472 0 1 1 3643
Health Index 0.902 0.175 -0.109 1 1 3643
Objective Job Characteristics (Z 2i )
Hours (monthly) 160.608 78.460 4 160 448 3607
Log Earnings (monthly) 7.891 1.064 2.303 8.006 12.101 2997
Ind1 0.290 0.454 0 0 1 3640
Ind2 0.171 0.377 0 0 1 3640
Ind3 0.330 0.470 0 0 1 3640
Ind4 0.208 0.406 0 0 1 3640
Ocup1 0.289 0.454 0 0 1 3643
Ocup2 0.072 0.258 0 0 1 3643
Ocup3 0.210 0.408 0 0 1 3643
Ocup4 0.242 0.428 0 0 1 3643
Ocup5 0.186 0.390 0 0 1 3643
Subjective Job Characteristics (Z 3i)
Stressful 0.511 0.500 0 1 1 3561
Dangerous 0.334 0.472 0 0 1 3619
Monotonous 0.162 0.368 0 0 1 3643
Progress Opportunities 0.643 0.479 0 1 1 3509
Good Schedule 0.839 0.367 0 1 1 3643
Well Remunerated 0.565 0.496 0 1 1 3573
Insecure Job 0.161 0.367 0 0 1 3171
Note: Education 1 = 1 if no education; Education 2 = 1 if primary school completed; Education 3 = 1 if high school completed; Education 4 = 1 if college completed;
Ind1= 1 if agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Ind2= 1 if manufacturing; Ind3 = 1 construction, retail, restaurants, transport and storage; Ind4 = 1 if electricity, 
gas, water, financial institutions, insurance and social services; Ocup1 = 1 if professionals, scientists, technicians and middle-level professionals; Ocup2 = 1 if clerks, 
service workers and sales person; Ocup3 = 1 if farmers and fishermen; Ocup4 = 1 if operators, artisans, plant operators; Ocup5 = 1 if no qualified workers.    25
Table 2.
Job Characteristics by Job Category







Job Satisfaction 0.865 0.731 0.837 0.943
Objective Job Characteristics (Z 2i)
Hours (monthly) 149.77 165.10 181.32 163.07
Log Earnings (monthly) 7.632 7.469 8.432 9.023
Ind1 0.379 0.344 0.086 0.014
Ind2 0.137 0.074 0.327 0.080
Ind3 0.399 0.362 0.178 0.135
Ind4 0.085 0.219 0.409 0.771
Ocup1 0.257 0.129 0.430 0.745
Ocup2 0.066 0.102 0.053 0.111
Ocup3 0.366 0.048 0.018 0.014
Ocup4 0.223 0.268 0.287 0.051
Ocup5 0.088 0.453 0.211 0.079
Subjective Job Characteristics (Z 3i)
Stressful 0.503 0.483 0.534 0.646
Dangerous 0.327 0.353 0.349 0.239
Monotonous 0.167 0.188 0.146 0.075
Progress Opportunity 0.644 0.514 0.718 0.767
Good Schedule 0.852 0.818 0.823 0.872
Well Remunerated 0.583 0.506 0.570 0.557
Insecure Job 0.106 0.291 0.197 0.086
Note: Ind1= 1 if agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Ind2= 1 if manufacturing; Ind3 = 1 construction, retail, restaurants, transport and storage; 
Ind4 = 1 if electricity, gas, water, financial institutions, insurance and social services; Ocup1 = 1 if professionals, scientists, technicians and 
middle-level professionals; Ocup2 = 1 if clerks, service workers and sales person, Ocup3 = 1 if farmers and fishermen; Ocup4 = 1 if operators, artisans, 
plant operators; Ocup5 = 1 if no qualified workers.  
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Table 3.
Probit-Mg Effects: All Workers, Honduras 18-64 Years Old
Dependent Variable: Job Satisfaction 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Salaried_small -0.1257*** -0.1226*** -0.1267*** -0.0755*** -0.0658*** -0.0398* -0.0629*** -0.0384*
(0.0205) (0.0218) (0.0227) (0.0238) (0.0217) (0.0229) (0.0216) (0.0228)
Salaried_lg_nobenefits -0.0165 -0.0411** -0.0301 -0.0460** -0.0082 -0.0073 -0.0071 -0.0065
(0.0152) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0218) (0.0182) (0.0211) (0.0181) (0.0209)
Salaried_lg_benefits 0.0961*** 0.0575 0.0757** 0.0541 0.0633** 0.0617* 0.0625** 0.0607*
(0.0260) (0.0362) (0.0330) (0.0428) (0.0291) (0.0344) (0.0288) (0.0342)
Male 0.0159 0.0001 -0.0347** -0.0193 -0.0404** -0.0202 -0.0395**
(0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.0139) (0.0167)
Age (years) 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0032 0.0035 0.0019 0.0042 0.0026
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0039)
A g e 2 00 0 . 0 0 0 1 0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Urban 0.0123 0.0224 -0.0038 0.0214 0.0084 0.019 0.0064
(0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.0142) (0.0156)
Education 2 0.0315** 0.0323** 0.0277* -0.0089 -0.0105 -0.0065 -0.0088
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0160) (0.0140) (0.0161)
Education 3 0.0693*** 0.0722*** 0.0557*** 0.0267 0.0185 0.0278 0.0201
(0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0249) (0.0211) (0.0246)
Education 4 0.0998*** 0.0999*** 0.0627** 0.0463** 0.0284 0.0464** 0.0286
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0259) (0.0227) (0.0293) (0.0224) (0.0290)
Married 0.0279** 0.0280** 0.0212 0.0098 0.0029 0.0095 0.0021
(0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0132) (0.0145) (0.0131) (0.0144)
Health Index 0.1392*** 0.1352*** 0.1404*** 0.0534* 0.0552 0.0549* 0.0562
(0.0311) (0.0311) (0.0352) (0.0316) (0.0364) (0.0315) (0.0362)
Hours (monthly) 0.0002*** 0 0.0003*** 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Ind2 -0.0902*** 0.0068 -0.0707*** -0.016 -0.0713*** -0.0148
(0.0259) (0.0284) (0.0263) (0.0302) (0.0264) (0.0301)
Ind3 -0.0302 0.0482* -0.0265 0.0204 -0.0278 0.0207
(0.0204) (0.0271) (0.0202) (0.0274) (0.0203) (0.0273)
Ind4 -0.0566** 0.0216 -0.0312 0.011 -0.0309 0.0132
(0.0245) (0.0274) (0.0239) (0.0278) (0.0240) (0.0277)
Stressful -0.0109 -0.0183 -0.0097 -0.0159
(0.0124) (0.0142) (0.0124) (0.0141)
Dangerous -0.0087 -0.0084 -0.0117 -0.0113
(0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0136) (0.0155)
Monotonous -0.0738*** -0.0558*** -0.0738*** -0.0556***
(0.0190) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0202)
Progress Opportunity 0.0882*** 0.0872*** 0.0892*** 0.0868***
(0.0150) (0.0170) (0.0150) (0.0170)
Good Schedule 0.1231*** 0.1188*** 0.1253*** 0.1211***
(0.0203) (0.0219) (0.0205) (0.0221)
Well Remunerated 0.1179*** 0.1280*** 0.1157*** 0.1271***
(0.0142) (0.0160) (0.0141) (0.0160)
Insecure Job -0.0840*** -0.0819*** -0.0834*** -0.0815***
(0.0196) (0.0211) (0.0196) (0.0211)
Optimism 0.0063 0.0075
(0.0043) (0.0049)
Log Earnings (monthly) 0.0554*** 0.0255*** 0.0252***
(0.0078) (0.0080) (0.0080)
Observations 3764 3743 3706 3068 3065 2550 3045 2536
Pseudo_R2 0.0176 0.0365 0.0444 0.067 0.181 0.191 0.184 0.194
Note 1: The omitted variables are Self-Employed, Education 1 and Industry 1
Note 2 : Education 1 = 1 if no education; Education 2 = 1 if primary school completed; Education 3 = 1 if high school completed; Education 4 = 1 if college completed;
Ind1= 1 if agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Ind2= 1 if manufacturing; Ind3 = 1 construction, retail, restaurants, transport and storage; Ind4 = 1 if electricity, 
gas, water, financial institutions, insurance and social services; Ocup1 = 1 if professionals, scientists, technicians and middle-level professionals; Ocup2 = 1 if clerks,   
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Table 4.
Heckman Two-Step Method


















Education 2 0.0193 0.0271
[0.0324] [0.0330]
Education 3 0.062 0.0725
[0.0489] [0.0490]
Education 4 0.0558 0.0625
[0.0511] [0.0520]
Health Index 0.1097* 0.1155**
[0.0594] [0.0580]
















Good Schedule 0.1570*** 0.1572***
[0.0273] [0.0251]
Well Remunaration 0.1842*** 0.1852***
[0.0245] [0.0231]
Insure Job -0.1117*** -0.1122***
[0.0266] [0.0259]




Wald test ch2 2.83 3.84
Prob>chi2 0.092 0.05
Log Likelihood -4278 -4287
Note: Selection controls in column (1) are the number of children aged
less than 10 years old and the interaction with female dummy in
in column (2) is the number of children between 4 and 10
years old and the interaction with female dummy.    28
 
Table 5.















Observations 3621 3621 1546
Pseudo_R2 0.0041 0.0124 0.0142
Note 1: No controls used in these estimations. Column (3) sample is salaried workers.













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Salaried_small -0.0792* -0.0252 -0.0134 -0.0263
(0.0475) (0.0337) (0.0349) (0.0506)
Salaried_large_nobenefits -0.0111 0.0059 0.0253 -0.0361
(0.0561) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0274)
Salaried_large_benefits 0.0328 0.0376** -0.0167
(0.0615) (0.0180) (0.0426)
Observations 754 1247 288 236
Pseudo_R2 0.199 0.164 0.372 0.46
Note 1: Controls in this regression are gender, age, age2, zone, levels of education. Marital status, hours worked, 
health index, sector, and job attributes such as: stressful, dangerous, monotonous, progress opportunity, good 
schedule, well remunerated, insecure job, and optimism. 
Note 2: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7.











Note 1: Controls in this regression are gender, age, age2, zone, levels of education. Marital status, hours worked, 
health index, sector, and job attributes such as: stressful, dangerous, monotonous, progress opportunity, good 
schedule, well remunerated, insecure job, and optimism. 





Probit-Mg Effects by Education, 18-64 Years Old, Other Countries
L o w  E d u c a t i o nH i g h  E d u c a t i o nL o w  E d u c a t i o nH i g h  E d u c a t i o n
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Salaried_small -0.1095 0.0425 -0.2053** -0.1463
(0.1079) (0.0557) (0.0981) (0.0947)
Salaried_large_nobenefits -0.0811 0.0954* -0.1918** -0.0567
(0.1364) (0.0488) (0.0772) (0.0546)
Salaried_large_benefits -0.1023 0.1210*** -0.0968 0.1371***
(0.1732) (0.0437) (0.2391) (0.0463)
Observations 108 291 292 256
Pseudo_R2 0.0139 0.0273 0.0359 0.0461
Note 1: Low education = 1 if education 1 or education 2 are equal to 1; High education = 1 if education 3 or education 4 are equal to 1
Note 2: No controls added.
Note 3: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1









Weighted Sample- 18 to 64 years old
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Dependent Variable
Job Satisfaction 0.815 0.388 382 0.812 0.391 529
Job Category, Firm Size and Benefit Status (Z1i)
Salaried_small 0.176 0.382 386 0.112 0.316 530
Salaried_large_benefits 0.255 0.436 386 0.064 0.246 530
Salaried_large_nobenefits 0.205 0.404 386 0.236 0.425 530
Self-employed 0.357 0.480 386 0.545 0.498 530
Individual Characteristics (Xi)
Male 0.623 0.485 386 0.701 0.458 530
Age (Years) 36.559 11.838 386 35.911 12.585 530
Age squared 1476.369 938.173 386 1447.683 982.128 530
Indigenous 0.455 0.498 530
Urban 0.513 0.500 386 0.416 0.493 530
Education 1 0.289 0.454 385 0.580 0.494 530
Education 2 0.402 0.491 385 0.269 0.444 530
Education 3 0.254 0.436 385 0.124 0.330 530
Education 4 0.056 0.230 385 0.027 0.163 530
Health Index 0.913 0.128 378 0.914 0.137 530
Objective Job Characteristics (Z 2i )
Hours (monthly) 161.824 63.879 386 176.698 75.380 530
Earnings (brackets from 1 to 5) 3.082 1.512 385 2.422 0.981 530
Ind1 0.318 0.466 386 0.383 0.487 530
Ind2 0.079 0.270 386 0.190 0.393 530
Ind3 0.412 0.493 386 0.204 0.404 530
Ind4 0.191 0.394 386 0.223 0.417 530
Ocup1 0.127 0.333 386 0.072 0.259 442
Ocup2 0.222 0.416 386 0.022 0.148 442
Ocup3 0.160 0.367 386 0.439 0.497 442
Ocup4 0.310 0.463 386 0.212 0.409 442
Ocup5 0.181 0.386 386 0.254 0.436 442
Subjective Job Characteristics (Z3i)
Stressful 0.369 0.483 379 0.424 0.495 528
Dangerous 0.387 0.488 385 0.436 0.496 526
Monotonous 0.368 0.483 384 0.260 0.439 527
Progress Opportunities 0.439 0.497 376 0.563 0.497 521
Good Schedule 0.789 0.409 384 0.811 0.392 528
Well Remunerated 0.340 0.474 381 0.396 0.489 522
Insecure Job 0.278 0.449 363 0.167 0.373 530
Note: Education 1 = 1 if no education; Education 2 = 1 if primary school completed; Education 3 = 1 if high school completed; Education 4 = 1 if college completed;
Ind1= 1 if agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Ind2= 1 if manufacturing; Ind3 = 1 construction, retail, restaurants, transport and storage; Ind4 = 1 if electricity, 
gas, water, financial institutions, insurance and social services; Ocup1 = 1 if professionals, scientists, technicians and middle-level professionals; Ocup2 = 1 if clerks, 
service workers and sales person; Ocup3 = 1 if farmers and fishermen; Ocup4 = 1 if operators, artisans, plant operators; Ocup5 = 1 if no qualified workers.
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